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IMPORTANT NOTE: do not use host-only mode, as issues have been discovered. Set the Billy Madison VM to "auto-detect" to get a regular DHCP address off your network.


Plot: Help Billy Madison stop Eric from taking over Madison Hotels!

Sneaky Eric Gordon has installed malware on Billy's computer right before the two of them are set to face off in an academic decathlon. Unless Billy can regain control of his machine and decrypt his 12th grade final project, he will not graduate from high school. Plus, it means Eric wins, and he takes over as head of Madison Hotels!


Objective: The primary objective of the VM is to figure out how Eric took over the machine and then undo his changes so you can recover Billy's 12th grade final project. You will probably need to root the box to complete this objective.


Download:

  • BillyMadison1dot0.zip - https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/5473387/BillyMadison1dot0.zip
  • MD5 = afcb926608d6d7b2471e4de6c367afb4
  • SHA1 = 4933ca408fcb2e88e6388fe4ea321f758b133d72

Other Information:

  • Size: 1.68GB
  • Hypervisor: Created with VMWare ESXi 6.0.0
  • Difficulty: Beginner/Moderate

Special Thanks To:

  • @rand0mbytez and @mrb3n813 for their tenacious help in beta testing, ironing out the bugs, suggesting better ways to do things, battling trolls and just generally being awesome.
  • @g0tmi1k, @_RastaMouse and the VulnHub crew for hosting VMs, encouraging VM creators/testers and being a tremendous resource to the infosec community.
  • @ReverseBrain for helping and testing with Vbox
  • My wife. She rules.
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NETinVM

A tool for teaching and learning about systems, networks and security

Authors: Carlos Perez & David Perez Date: 2016-11-03

Introduction

NETinVM is a VMware virtual machine image that provides the user with a complete computer network. For this reason, NETinVM can be used for learning about operating systems, computer networks and system and network security.

In addition, since NETinVM is a VMware image, it can be used for demonstrations (i.e. in classrooms) that can be reproduced by students either in a laboratory or on their own laptop and thus, at home, at the library... For these reasons we present NETinVM as an educational tool.

Description of NETinVM

NETinVM is a VMware virtual machine image that contains, ready to run, a series of User-mode Linux (UML) virtual machines. When started, the UML virtual machines create a whole computer network; hence the name NETinVM, an acronym for NETwork in Virtual Machine. This virtual network has been called 'example.net' and has fully qualified domain names defined for the systems: 'base.example.net', 'fw.example.net', etc.

All of the virtual machines use the Linux operating system. The VMware virtual machine is called 'base' and it runs openSUSE 13.2. User-mode Linux machines use Debian 6.0 and they have different names depending on their network location, because they are grouped into three different subnets: corporate, perimeter and external. The subnetworks are named 'int' (for internal network), 'dmz' (for DMZ or demilitarized zone, usually used as a synonym for perimeter network) and 'ext' (for external network).

One of the UML machines, 'fw', interconnects the three networks ('int, 'dmz' and 'ext'), allowing for communication and packet filtering. The rest of the UML machines have only one network interface, connected to the network they are named after:

int<X> + UMLs connected to the internal network. can take values from 'a' to 'f', both inclusive. These machines only offer SSH service by default.

dmz<X> + UMLs connected to the perimeter network (DMZ). They are supposed to be bastion nodes. Two preconfigured bastion nodes are provided, each one with its appropriate alias: + 'dmza' is aliased as 'www.example.net' and it offers HTTP and HTTPS services. + 'dmzb' is aliased as 'ftp.example.net' and it offers FTP.

ext<X> + UMLs connected to the external network (ie: Internet). Because a picture paints a thousand words, or so they say, the following figure shows NETinVM with all of the virtual machines running inside.

General view of NETinVM in VMware. The document example-net.pdf offers a detailed view.

All of the elements referenced before are shown in the image with their IP and ethernet addresses. The following rules have been used for assigning addresses:

  • IP addresses are of the form 10.5.., where is either 0 ('ext'), 1 ('dmz') or 2 ('int'), and is either 10 for 'exta', 'dmza' or 'inta', 11 for 'b' and so on up to 15 for 'f'.
  • Network masks are 24 bits (255.255.255.0).
  • Ethernet addresses are CA:FE:00:00:0:0, where is either 0, 1 or 2 (following the same domain rule as IP addressing) and is either a, b, c, d, e or f.
  • The interfaces of 'fw' use 254 for IP and FE for ethernet.
  • The interfaces of 'base' use 1 for IP and 01 for ethernet.

In addition to the computers and networks already described, the figure also shows the real computer where NETinVM runs ('REAL COMPUTER') and VMware Player's typical network interface ('vmnet8'), which optionally interconnects NETinVM's networks with the external word.

When they boot, all UML virtual machines get their network configuration from 'base', which provides DHCP and DNS services to the three NETinVM networks through its interfaces 'tap0', 'tap1' and 'tap2'.

Routing works as follows:

  • The default gateway for the internal and perimeter networks (machines 'int' and 'dmz') is 'fw' (more specifically, the IP address of 'fw' in the corresponding internal or perimeter subnet).
  • The default gateway for 'fw' is 'base' (its external network address). 'base' (its external network address) is also the default gateway for machines in the external network ('ext'), but they are configured to use 'fw' (external network address) as the gateway for accessing machines in the perimeter and internal networks.
  • 'fw' applies NAT (SNAT, Masquerading) to all network traffic coming into it from the internal and perimeter networks and going out through its interface in the external network. So, these packets get to the external network with a source IP address of 10.5.0.254 (fw's IP address in the external network)
  • Thus, IP traffic exchanged among the three networks goes through 'fw', while traffic going out from NETinVM to the external world goes through 'fw' if (and only if) it comes from the internal or perimeter networks. All traffic going to the real world (outside NETinVM) exits through 'base' which, as 'fw' does, applies IP forwarding and NAT to this outgoing traffic.

Communication between 'base' and any UML machine, in both directions, is direct, without going through 'fw'. (When the communication is started from a UML machine, the IP address of the interface of 'base' in the corresponding network must be used.) This configuration permits access from 'base' to all UML machines using SSH independently of the packet filtering configuration at 'fw'.

As an additional consideration, please note that the SNAT configuration in 'fw' described above is necessary for responses to outgoing connections to the Internet originating from the internal or perimeter networks to come back through 'fw'. Otherwise they would be routed directly from 'base' to the UML machine through 'tap1' or 'tap2' without traversing 'fw'.

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This is my first boot2root machine. It's begginer-intermediate level.

It's been tested in VBox and VMware and seems to work without issues in both.

A tip, anything can be a vector, really think things through here based on how the machine works. Make a wrong move though and some stuff gets moved around and makes the machine more difficult!

This is part one in a two part series. I was inspired by several vms I found on vulnhub and added a bit of a twist to the machine.

Good luck and I hope you guys enjoy!


This is my first CTF/Vulnerable VM ever. I created it both for educational purposes and so people can have a little fun testing their skills in a legal, pentest lab environment.

Some notes before you download!

  • Try to use a Host-Only Adapter. This is an intentionally vulnerable machine and leaving it open on your network can have bad results.
  • It should work with Vmware flawlessly. I've tested it with vbox and had one other friend test it on Vbox as well so I think it should work just fine on anything else.

This is a Boot2Root machine. The goal is for you to attempt to attempt to gain root privileges in the VM. Do not try to get the root flag through a recovery iso etc, this is essentially cheating! The idea is to get through by pretending this machine is being attacked over a network with no physical access.

I themed this machine to make it feel a bit more realistic. You are breaking into a fictional characters server (named Wallaby) and trying to gain root without him noticing, or else the difficulty level will increase if you make the wrong move! Good luck and I hope you guys enjoy!

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Welcome to another boot2root / CTF this one is called Analougepond. The VM is set to grab a DHCP lease on boot. I've tried to mix things up a little on this one, and have used the feedback from #vulnhub to make this VM a little more challenging (I hope).

Since you're not a Teuchter, I'll offer some hints to you:

Remember TCP is not the only protocol on the Internet My challenges are never finished with root. I make you work for the flags. The intended route is NOT to use forensics or 0-days, I will not complain either way.

To consider this VM complete, you need to have obtained:

  • Troll Flag: where you normally look for them
  • Flag 1: You have it when you book Jennifer tickets to Paris on Pan Am.
  • Flag 2: It will include a final challenge to confirm you hit the jackpot.
  • Have root everywhere (this will make sense once you're in the VM)
  • User passwords
  • 2 VNC passwords

Best of luck! If you get stuck, eat some EXTRABACON

NB: Please allow 5-10 minutes or so from powering on the VM for background tasks to run before proceeding to attack.

Changelog

  • v0.1b - Initial Version
  • v01.c - Fixes for flags based on feedback from mrB3n
  • v0.1d - Fixes based on shortcut to intended route
  • v0.2a - Fixes and clean up of disks for smaller OVA export
  • v0.2b - Small edit to remove copy of flag in wrong folder

SHA1SUM: D75AA2405E2DFB30C1470358EFD0767A10CF1EB1 analoguepond-0.2b.ova

Many thanks to mrB3n, Rand0mByteZ and kevinnz for testing this CTF.

A special thank you to g0tmi1k for hosting all these challenges and offering advice. A tip of the hat to mrb3n for his recent assistence.

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA512

Welcome to

  ___           _            ___          _
 |   \ ___ _ _ | |_____ _  _|   \ ___  __| |_____ _ _
 | |) / _ \ ' \| / / -_) || | |) / _ \/ _| / / -_) '_|
 |___/\___/_||_|_\_\___|\_, |___/\___/\__|_\_\___|_|
                        |__/
                             Made with <3 v.1.0 - 2017

This is my first boot2root - CTF VM. I hope you enjoy it. if you run into any issue you can find me on Twitter: @dhn_ or feel free to write me a mail to:

  • Email: [email protected]
  • GPG key: 0x2641123C
  • GPG fingerprint: 4E3444A11BB780F84B58E8ABA8DD99472641123C

Level: I think the level of this boot2root challange is hard or intermediate.

Try harder!: If you are confused or frustrated don't forget that enumeration is the key!

Thanks: Special thanks to @1nternaut for the awesome CTF VM name!

Feedback: This is my first boot2root - CTF VM, please give me feedback on how to improve!

Tested: This VM was tested with:

  • VMware Workstation 12 Pro
  • VMware Workstation 12 Player
  • VMware vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi) 6.5

Networking: DHCP service: Enabled

IP address: Automatically assign

SHA-1:

77439cb457a03d554bec78303dc42e5d3074ff85  DonkeyDocker-disk1.vmdk
d3193cca484f7f1b36c20116f49e9025bf60889c  DonkeyDocker.mf
7013d6a7c151332c99c0e96d34b812e0e7ce3d57  DonkeyDocker.ovf

Looking forward to the write-ups!

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